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Military Veterans and VA Medical Treatment:
Must aVeteran Prove Fault Before Receiving
Compensation for Medical Injuries?
by William L. Andreen

Glance
Fred Gardner challenges

William L. Andreen is the Edgar L.
Clarkson Professorof Law at the
University of Alabama School of
Law, Box 870382, Tuscaloosa,AL
35487-0382; (205) 348-7091.

a long-standing Veterans
Affairs' interpretation of a
federal statute under
which a military veteran
is compensated for
injuries caused by VA
medical treatment of conditions not related to the
veteran's military service.
The success or failure of
Gardner's challenge is
significant to veterans for
it will establish whether a
veteran must prove the
VA's fault in connection
with an injury sustained
during the delivery of
medical treatment or
simply prove that the
injury was not caused
by the veteran's willful
misconduct.

For many years, the Department of
Veterans Affairs and its predecessors, the Veterans' Administration
and the Veterans' Bureau (collectively, the "VA"), had stood as the only
large federal agency whose major
activities were immune from judicial
review. That special status ended in
1988 when Congress passed the
Veterans' Judicial Review Act giving
military veterans a day in court. As
a consequence of the Veteran's
Judicial Review Act, a number of VA
regulations are subject to judicial
review for the first time.
One of those regulations is at issue
in this case - a long-standing interpretation of a federal statute that
provides compensation for any
injury sustained by a veteran as a
result of VA medical treatment for
nonservice-related medical conditions. The interpretation being challenged requires a veteran injured
while receiving such treatment to
prove that the VA was at fault or
that the injury was an accident.

of VA medical treatment for nonservice-related conditions resulted from
either fault or from an accident?
FACTS
Fred P. Gardner is a veteran of the
Korean conflict. In 1986, he was
admitted to a VA hospital for the
evaluation and treatment of a nonservice-related back condition. VA
physicians diagnosed a herniated
disc and removed it. Gardner claims
that he suffered permanent neurological damage from the operation
that has caused pain, atrophy, and
weakness in his left leg. As a result,
he says that he must wear a leg
brace and use a cane.
Two years after the surgery, Gardner
filed a claim for disability benefits
with the VA's Regional Office in
Waco, Texas. His claim was denied.
Gardner appealed to the Board
of Veterans' Appeals (the "Board")
which affirmed the denial of benefits
in an unreported opinion. The
Board, following VA regulation
3.358(c)(3), 38 C.F.R. § 3.358(c)(3),
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ISSUE
Did the VA reasonably interpret
a 1924 federal statute when it
required veterans to establish, as a
precondition to the award of compensation, that injuries arising out
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held that a veteran was entitled to
compensation under the statute,
38 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. IV 1992)
("Section 1151"), only if the injury
was caused by the "carelessness,
negligence, lack of proper skill, error
in judgment, or similar instances of
indicated fault" on the part of the
VA or was caused by some sort of
unforeseen "accident." After reviewing the evidence, the Board concluded that Gardner had failed to prove
that his injury resulted from negligent treatment or an unforeseeable
accident. According to the Board,
Gardner's problem was just a common occurrence associated with
back surgery. Gardner responded
by appealing to the newly created
Court of Veterans Appeals (the
"Veterans Court").
The Veterans Court, sitting as a
three-judge panel, reversed the
Board and struck down the VA's regulation as inconsistent with Section
1151 and beyond the VA's scope of
authority. Gardnerv. Derwinski,
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 1 Vet.
App. 584 (1991). The court held that
the statute on its face imposed no
requirement that an injured veteran
show either fault or accident, a conclusion the court found neither
absurd nor contrary to congressional
intent as evidenced by Section
1151's legislative history. The court
was unpersuaded by the VA's argument that subsequent Congresses
had ratified its statutory interpretation by re-enacting the statute. In
essence, the Veterans Court declined
to defer to the VA's interpretation of
what the court thought was clear
statutory language. The court sent
the case back to the VA for further
proceedings on Gardner's claim.
Dissatisfied with this result, the VA
appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. That court, however, also held that the VA's fault-oraccident requirement was invalid.
Gardnerv. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
American Bar Association

Dismissing the VA's argument that
Section 1151 is ambiguous, the
Federal Circuit held that the statute
contained no literal reference either
to fault by VA personnel or to an
accident as a precondition to compensation. The Federal Circuit then
reviewed Section 1151's original
enactment and concluded that the
omission appeared intentional. The
court noted that congressional discussion prior to passage spoke both
of fault-based liability and no-fault
liability and reasoned that Congress
must have known what it was doing
when it failed to use the word fault
or some similar word somewhere in
the statute, except to require that
the veteran must be fault-free in
order to receive compensation.
According to the Federal Circuit, the
legislative history of Section 1151
demonstrates that Congress' main
concern was to compensate veterans
injured by VA medical treatment
and, to further that purpose, drafted
language that would relieve them of
the burden of proving negligence or
an accident.
The Federal Circuit also examined
the statute's re-enactment and the
VA's interpretation of the statute. In
doing so, the court found that the
VA had failed to show that it had
definitively interpreted the statute
to require fault prior to Congress'
1936 re-enactment of the statute.
The Federal Circuit also brushed
aside the VA's plea that the judiciary
should defer to a long-standing
administrative interpretation. On
this point, the court reasoned that
where statutory language is clear
on its face, there is no room for a
contrary judicial interpretation.
Moreover, the court noted that the
VA's interpretation may have stood
for nearly 60 years but only because,
until 1988, VA interpretations of its
regulations enjoyed a "splendid
isolation" from any form of
judicial review.

The VA then turned to the Supreme
Court, which granted its petition
for a writ of certiorari to review the
decision of the Federal Circuit. 114
S. Ct. 1396 (1994).
CASE ANALYSIS
When facing a question of statutory
interpretation, the logical starting
point is the statute's language. Watt
v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981).
Section 1151, the statutory provision at issue in this case, declares
that "[w]here any veteran shall
have suffered an injury, or an aggravation of an injury, as the result of
hospitalization, [or] medical or surgical treatment... awarded under
any of the laws administered by the
[VA],... and not the result of such
veteran's own willful misconduct,
and such injury or aggravation
results in additional disability to or
the death of such veteran," the VA
will award compensation for the
incremental disability or death in
the same way as if it were service
connected.
A court, not an administrative
agency such as the VA, is also the
final authority in any question of
statutory interpretation. Thus, if an
agency's statutory interpretation is
inconsistent with the clear intent of
the legislative body that enacted
the statute, here, Congress, a court
"must give effect to that unambiguously expressed intent." Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
On the other hand, if an agency's
interpretation of a statute it administers neither contradicts the
statute's language nor frustrates its
purpose, the role of a reviewing
court is much more limited. In
such a case, the agency's construction will be upheld as long as it is
reasonable in the eyes of the court.

(Continued on page 51)

The degree of deference shown to
an agency's statutory interpretation
will increase, where, for instance,
the interpretation was made contemporaneously with the statute's
passage, National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir.
1982), or has been consistent and
long-standing, SEC v. Sloan, 436
U.S. 103 (1978).
Complicating matters is the meaning to be given to an agency's interpretation of a statute that is reenacted by a later Congress. For
example, does re-enactment say
anything about Congress' view of
the pre-existing agency interpretation of the re-enacted statute?
As a general rule, Congress is presumed to be aware of and to accept
well-established agency interpretations of a statute it later re-enacts.
Young v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 983 (1986).
However, much less weight attaches
to a re-enactment if it is unclear
that Congress was aware of a preexisting agency interpretation of the
re-enacted statute. Sloan, 436 U.S.
at 121; National Wildlife Fed'n, 693
F.2d at 167.
The agency interpretation at issue
in this case states that
compensation is not payable
for either the contemplated
or foreseeable after results of
approved medical or surgical
care properly administered, no
matter how remote, in the
absence of a showing that
additional disability or death
proximately resulted through
carelessness, negligence, lack of
proper skill, error in judgment,
or similar instances of ... fault
[by the VAJ. However, compensation is payable in the event
...of an "accident" (an unforeseen, untoward event), causing
additional disability or death ....
38 C.F.R. § 3.358(c)(3).

Unlike the regulation, Section 1151
contains no literal reference to fault
or accident as a condition to compensation. The VA argues, however,
that the language of Section 1151 is
not so clear that it can be applied
without interpretation. The VA's contention in this regard rests largely
upon the statutory requirement that
a veteran suffer "injury... as the
result of" VA medical care. Thus,
according to the VA, a veteran must
show both injury and causation.
Although conceding that the most
common definition of the word
injury is some sort of hurt or damage, the VA asserts that the word
could also include some connotation
of fault. Thus, argues the VA, a veteran must prove that the injury he or
she suffered is the kind for which
Congress meant to provide compensation - in this case, an injury
which the VA caused through its
own fault.
The VA continues by noting that it
would be presumptuous to assume
that Congress meant to adopt a
no-fault standard back in 1924.
According to the VA, such an
approach would have represented a
sharp break with traditional medical
malpractice doctrine prevailing at
the time - a breach that the VA
implies would have been discussed
expressly had Congress intended to
take such a dramatic step. Viewed in
this way, the VA contends that the
language of Section 1151 is ambiguous and that its long-standing
interpretation of that language is a
reasonable one. Accordingly, the
VA maintains that the Federal
Circuit erred when it failed to defer
to the agency's interpretation of
Section 1151.
Gardner, on the other hand, argues
that the VA has ignored the plain
meaning of the statute in an effort to
create and then exploit an ambiguity
in the text. In doing so, Gardner

contends that the VA has failed to
give statutory terms their ordinary
and common sense meaning.
Gardner also asserts that Congress'
failure to use a fault standard was no
oversight. According to Gardner, the
fact that Congress explicitly prohibited the award of compensation
benefits where a veteran is guilty of
willful misconduct indicates that
Congress had considered and rejected the notion of applying a fault
concept to VA medical personnel.
Here, Gardner insists that Congress
knew how to create a fault-based
standard and did so, albeit in a very
modest way, by conditioning a
veteran's compensation on his or
her lack of fault.
Gardner proceeds to point out that
Congress was not wedded to traditional negligence, i.e., fault, concepts
in 1924. Thus, Gardner argues that
the willful misconduct standard
applicable to a veteran would protect
the veteran against his or her own
negligence despite the fact that a
claimant's own negligence was
widely recognized as a standard
defense to negligence actions in
1924. Moreover, Gardner argues that
the no-fault approach was a common
ingredient in both federal and state
worker's compensation schemes at
the time of the statute's original
enactment.
While the word injury may not have
been defined by Congress, the word,
according to Gardner, is used in its
ordinary sense elsewhere in the
statute. For example, the sections
that provide disability compensation
for conditions arising out of wartime
and peacetime service use similar
language and do not require a veteran to prove fault. Thus, argues
Gardner, a veteran who suffers a surgical injury while being treated for a
service-related ailment is entitled to
compensation without any showing
of fault. The regulation under attack
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here, however, would require a veteran who is identically situated except for the fact that the injury for
which treatment was sought was not
service-related - to establish fault
or accident or, otherwise, receive
nothing. Gardner contends that
there is no indication that Congress
intended to treat these two cases in
such radically different ways.
Gardner next argues that a no-fault
standard is consistent with the
paternalistic nature of the overall
scheme for providing VA benefits.
Here, Gardner notes that the VA has
a duty to help a veteran investigate
and present his or her case at the
administrative level and that the VA
is required to resolve all doubt in the
veteran's favor. In 1924, and, indeed,
until 1988, there was a $10 congressionally-imposed limit on attorneys'
fees for representing a veteran before
the VA. Gardner, thus, concludes
that a no-fault approach is an essential aspect of the VA system. He
insists that it would have been
unreasonable for Congress, even in
1924, to believe that a veteran could
prove fault when he was not only forbidden to spend more than $10 on
an attorney but had to rely on the
VA itself for evidence of its fault.
While recourse to legislative history
is sometimes said to be unnecessary
if a statutory provision has a plain
meaning, Darby v. Cisneros, 113
S.Ct. 2539 (1993), there is no rule of
law that would forbid the Supreme
Court from reviewing the legislative
materials. Train v. Colorado Public
Interest Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
Where the statutory language is
clear, however, it would take an
extraordinarily strong showing of
legislative intent to overcome the
provision's plain meaning. Glaxo
Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894
F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990). And, even
if the language is not entirely clear,
there is no guarantee that the
legislative history will cast much
light upon the problem.
American Bar Association

The VA contends here that the
ambiguity it finds in the text of
Section 1151 is reinforced by the
legislative history. In support of this
contention, the VA identifies several
places where testimony on the bill
referred to compensation in the
event of accident or negligence.
Nevertheless, even the VA is forced
to acknowledge that the legislative
history also refers to the availability
of compensation under a no-fault
arrangement, a reference that renders the legislative history less than
conclusive.
The VA argues, however, that its
early interpretation of Section
1151 suggests that Congress never
intended to create a broad no-fault
insurance type of program. Despite
the fact that some VA field offices
adjudicated cases on a no-fault basis
between 1924 and 1926, the VA
points to several restrictive, faultbased regulations it adopted between
1926 and 1930.
The Federal Circuit, however, was
unpersuaded. According to that
court, none of these restrictive
regulations explicitly precluded
the award of compensation in the
absence of fault. Nevertheless, the
VA insists that it applied its restrictive regulations to require proof of
fault in two of its adjudications
occurring in 1928 and 1930.
Gardner challenges the VA's assertions by pointing out that neither
the 1928 nor the 1930 adjudication
turned on the question of fault. In
fact, Gardner contends, as the
Federal Circuit held in this case,
that proof of fault did not become an
absolute prerequisite until August
1934, five months after Congress
had re-enacted the statute.
The resolution of the foregoing point
is important in two respects. First,
an interpretation contemporaneous
with the statute's re-enactment

would heighten the degree of judicial deference, if any, accorded the
VA's statutory interpretation.
Second, Congress re-enacted the
entire statute, including the provision at issue here, in March 1934. If
Congress was aware of, or is presumed to have been aware of, the
VA's interpretation, one could say
that it had ratified the VA's position.
The VA argues, of course, that
Congress adopted its interpretation
when the statute was re-enacted in
1934. Although asserting that
Congress is ordinarily presumed to
be aware of established administrative interpretations, the VA also
tries to show that Congress was
actually aware of its prior construction. In doing so, the VA emphasizes that the senator who introduced the amendment restoring
certain benefits described his proposal as covering cases in which a
veteran was disabled due to "mistreatment" or "in a case of malpractice by a government surgeon."
Finally, the VA points out that the
1934 legislation was passed in the
midst of the Great Depression,
hardly a time when Congress would
enact a costly scheme of no-fault
insurance.
Gardner responds that there was
no definitive agency interpretation
vis-a-vis fault at the time Congress
acted; that interpretation came
later in August 1934. In any case,
Gardner maintains that re-enactment cannot serve as proof of
approval because there is no
indication and no evidence that
Congress was aware of the VA's
position. With regard to the senator
who referred to the statute in terms
of malpractice and mistreatment,
Gardner claims that such isolated
and cryptic remarks should be
given no weight.

(Continued on page 53)

Since 1934, Congress has re-enacted
Section 1151 several times. The VA
asserts that, due to Congress's close
attention to veterans' benefits, it is
safe to assume that Congress knew
about the VA's construction of
Section 1151. Moreover, the VA
maintains that if Congress was
upset about the fault-or-accident
requirement found in the VA's
regulations since at least 1936, it
would have said so.
Gardner counters by arguing that it
is dangerous to read too much into
congressional silence. In any event,
Gardner argues that no amount of
judicial deference can save the VA's
interpretation if it runs counter to
the plain meaning of the statute.
SIGNIFICANCE
The question of no-fault liability for
injuries that occur during VA medical treatment is a matter of great
importance to veterans and the VA
alike. The VA is a huge social-service agency that, in a typical year,
pays veterans and their dependents
over $12 billion in compensation
benefits. Accordingly, the imposition
of no-fault liability could place a
tremendous financial burden upon
the VA, a burden which could affect
adversely the availability or delivery
of some of its services. On the other
hand, the imposition of no-fault liability certainly lightens the not
inconsiderable burden that currently rests on veterans to prove either

negligence or unforeseeable accident
before qualifying for benefits. Such a
change, coupled with the newly
established judicial review of VA
decisions concerning benefits, could
help improve the VA's provision of
medical services, to the resounding
applause of veterans and their
dependents.
ARGUMENTS
For Jesse Brown, Secretary of
Veterans Affairs (Counsel of Record:
Drew S. Days, III, Solicitor General;
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC 20530; (202) 514-2217):
1. The VA's long-standing interpretation of Section 1151 rests on a permissible construction of the statutory language.
2. The history of the provision's
enactment, re-enactment, and consistent application supports the VA's
interpretation.
For Fred P. Gardner (Counsel of
Record: Joseph Michael Hannon, Jr.;
Thompson, O'Donnell, Markham,
Norton & Hannon; 805 15th Street,
NW, Suite 705, Washington, DC
20005; (202) 289-1133):
1. The plain language and legislative
history of Section 1151, the overall
no-fault scheme of benefits legislation for veterans, and the contextual
use of "injury" and "as a result of" in
the statute preclude the imposition
of a fault requirement.

2. The VA's interpretation of this
provision is not entitled to any
deference.
3. The re-enactment and amendment of the statute fail to justify the
VA's fault-based regulation.
4. These regulations are not entitled
to deference under Chevron and
should, therefore, be subject to
rigorous review.

AMIcus BRIEFS
In support of Fred P. Gardner
National Veterans Legal Services
Project (Counsel of Record:
Ronald S. Flagg; Sidley & Austin;
1722 Eye Street, NW, Washington,
DC 20006; (202) 736-8000);
Joint brief of the Paralyzed
Veterans of America; Veterans of
Foreign Wars; American Veterans of
WW II, Korea, and Vietnam; Blinded
Veterans Association; and Vietnam
Veterans of America (Counsel of
Record: Lawrence B. Hagel, Deputy
General Counsel of the Paralyzed
Veterans of America; 801 18th
Street, NW, Washington DC 20006;
(202) 416-7637);
The State of Texas (Counsel of
Record: Don Morales, Attorney
General of the State of Texas; P.O.
Box 12548, Capitol Station, Austin,
TX 78711-2548; (512) 463-2055).
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